Hard Times or Great Expectations? Dividend Omissions and Dividend Cuts by UK Firms*

This paper uncovers an increasing proportion of quoted UK companies omitting cash dividends. Using a large panel of quoted UK firms, we estimate panel data probit models for the incidence of dividend omissions and cuts as functions of financial characteristics including cash flow, leverage, investment opportunities, investment and company size. These variables account for most of the increase in omission since 1995. There is relatively little evidence to link this to the major tax reform of 1997 that abolished tax refunds on dividend income payable to tax‐exempt institutions. Significant persistence effects indicate companies are slow to adjust their balance sheets through their dividend.     

Public Sector Capital and the Production Efficiency of U.S. Regional Manufacturing Industries

This paper applies a stochastic frontier production model with time-varying technical efficiency to investigate the relationship between public capital and technical efficiency. It is based on the proposition that public capital has an effect on actual output by enhancing technical efficiency, thereby reducing the gap between maximum potential output and actual output. Empirical results using panel data from U.S. state manufacturing industries during 1969–86 show that technical efficiencies varied substantially, both between states and between years; variations in technical efficiency are significantly explained by variations in public-sector capital.
JEL Classification Numbers: O20, H54, C23.     

The mixed economy for public service consumers. The case of consumer agencies for public transportation

The phrase mixed economy of welfare refers to the observation that the provision of public services in western countries frequently involves the participation of other sectors in addition to government. For example, a service may be privately financed and produced but regulated by government, financed by government subsidies or vouchers but produced privately, or produced by a commercial or voluntary organization under contract to government. But such different ways in which government can arrange public service supply by no means exhaust the varieties of arrangements in a mixed economic system. Other examples include alternative institutional arrangements for articulating consumer wants for public services, evaluating consumer satisfaction, and holding the producers of services accountable for their performance.This paper examines the role of official public advisory bodies and private, voluntary associations whose purposes are to improve services to users of U.S. public transportation. At variance with some of the theory of political economy, it is found that the public and private consumer organizations generally enjoy a symbiotic rather than substitute or competitive relationship with one another, and that both kinds of organizations arise and complement each other in addressing the problems of consumers of a government service produced under monopoly conditions.

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Die Beteiligung mehrerer Wirtschaftssektoren bei der Versorgung mit öffentlichen Diensten — der Fall der amerikanischen Verbraucher-Agenturen für öffentlichen Nahverkehr

Zusammenfassung Der Ausdruck mixed economy of welfare bezieht sich auf die Beobachtung, daß die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern in westlichen Ländern häufig nicht allein durch den Staat erfolgt. So kann zum Beispiel ein öffentliches Gut privat finanziert und hergestellt werden, aber unter öffentlicher Aufsicht stehen, oder es kann von der öffentlichen Hand bezahlt aber privat produziert werden, oder es kann durch eine kommerzielle oder gemeinnützige Organisation in Absprache mit staatlichen Stellen produziert werden. Ebenso gibt es Fälle, wo öffentlicher und privater Hersteller eines vergleichbaren Gutes verschiedene Marktseggmente versorgen. Beispielsweise stehen in den USA den Bürgern, die mit öffentlichen Schulen unzufrieden sind, private Schulen zur Verfügung.Diese Beispiele zeigen, auf welchen unterschiedlichen Wegen die Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern rangiert werden kann. Solche angebotsorientierten Beispiele zeigen aber nur einen Teil der möglichen Sektorverbindungen in einer Mischwirtschaft. Andere Beispiele treffen eher die Nachfrageseite bei öffentlichen Gütern, insbesondere die institutionellen Möglichkeiten für die Artikulation von Verbraucherwünschen hinsichtlich öffentlicher Güter für die Erfassung der Zufriedenheit und dafür, daß die Anbieter öffentlicher Güter für ihr Leistungsniveau einstehen müssen. Solche Beispiele zeigen, daß Einrichtungen wie Kommissionen für öffentliche Dienste, Departements für Konsumentenfragen, Ombudsmänner und eine Vielzahl privater und freiwilliger Organisationen in unterschiedlichster Weise tätig werden, um die Interessen von Bürgern zu schützen, die öffentliche Leistungen in Anspruch nehmen.Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet solche Einrichtungen für öffentlichen Nah- und Fernverkehr in den USA. Ebenso wie in England gibt es hier sowohl offizielle öffentliche Beratungsgremien wie auch private freiwillige Einrichtungen, deren Zielsetzung ganz ähnlich sind, nämlich die Leistungen der öffentlichen Verkehrsunternehmungen zu verbessern. Der Beitrag berichtet über die Ergebnisse einer empirischen Studie beider Arten von Gremien und versucht die Rolle beider Arten in einer Mischwirtschaft zu beschreiben. Insbesondere versucht der Beitrag, zu erklären, warum beide Arten von Gremien entstehen, welches Verhältnis sie zu einander und zu den Transportunternehmen haben. Im Gegensatz zu manchen theoretischen Annahmen erwies sich, daß öffentliche und private Verbraucherorganisationen weniger in einem substitutiven oder wettbewerblichen Verhältnis zueinander stehen, sondern eher eine Symbiose miteinander bilden, und daß sich beide Arten von Organisationen häufig bei der Behandlung von Problemen ergänzen.The author is indebted to his former student and research assistant Chester Phillips for carrying out the survey for this paper. He would also like to thank his colleague Richard Silkman for insightful comments and suggestions on the first draft and Beverly Dolinsky of the Permanent Citizens Advisory Committee to the MTA in New York City for the time and information she provided. Finally, the author wants to thank Ken Judge for providing the stimulus to write this paper through the invitation to participate in the 1983 Social Administration Association Conference in Canterbury, England, where this paper was first presented, and Harry Weiner for arranging support to allow attendance at that conference.

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Dennis R. Young is a Professor at W. Averell Harriman College for Policy Analysis and Public Management, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York 11794, USA.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

Uncertainty and the theory of international trade in long-run equilibrium

We consider a country with two factors and two industries, each of which faces technical and price uncertainty. Entrepreneurs choose outputs in order to maximize the expected utility of profits. They also draw factor payments and purchase consumption goods after the uncertainty isresolved. They enter and exit from an industry according to whether participation there increases their expected utility. Within this model, the validity of the propositions of neoclassical trade theory depends on how the entrepreneurs' entry decisions are affected by parameter changes via their roles as risk bearers, consumers and factor owners.     

Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective

Earnings management has been cast into negative light due to the recent corporate scandals and, therefore, is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Enron and Worldcom represent two of the most egregious cases of opportunistic earnings management that led to the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history. However, some argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it improves the information value of earnings by conveying private information to the stockholders and the public. We offer agency theory as a tool to distinguish between the opportunistic and beneficial uses of earnings management. The empirical evidence suggests that firms where earnings management occurs to a larger (less) extent suffer less (more) agency costs. Moreover, a positive relation is documented between firm value and the extent of earnings management. Taken together, the results reveal that earnings management is, on average, not detrimental.     

Educational attainment and cohort size

"We argue that the postwar baby boom [in the United States] caused substantial fluctuations in both the economic rewards to education and educational attainment over the last 3 decades. If substitutability between young and old workers diminishes with education, the present value of lifetime earnings for a boom cohort is depressed more for highly educated workers, reducing incentives for educational attainment. The opposite is true for pre- and postboom cohorts. The diminishing substitutability hypothesis explains the declines in both the returns to college and college completion rates in the 1970s and predicts a substantial increase in educational attainment for postboomers."     

Finite Dimensional Affine Realisations of HJM Models in Terms of Forward Rates and Yields

Finite dimensional Markovian HJM term structure models provide ideal settings for the study of term structure dynamics and interest rate derivatives where the flexibility of the HJM framework and the tractability of Markovian models coexist. Consequently, these models became the focus of a series of papers including Carverhill (1994), Ritchken and Sankarasubramanian (1995), Bhar and Chiarella (1997), Inui and Kijima (1998), de Jong and Santa-Clara (1999), Björk and Svensson (2001) and Chiarella and Kwon (2001a). However, these models usually required the introduction of a large number of state variables which, at first sight, did not appear to have clear links to the market observed quantities, and the explicit realisations of the forward rate curve in terms of the state variables were unclear. In this paper, it is shown that the forward rate curves for these models are affine functions of the state variables, and conversely that the state variables in these models can be expressed as affine functions of a finite number of forward rates or yields. This property is useful, for example, in the estimation of model parameters. The paper also provides explicit formulae for the bond prices in terms of the state variables that generalise the formulae given in Inui and Kijima (1998), and applies the framework to obtain affine representations for a number of popular interest rate models.     

Real estate return correlations: Real-world limitations on relationships inferred from NCREIF data

Correlation estimates for returns between individual properties are subject to large inherent uncertainties due to limits on the amount of data that is likely to be available for the foreseeable future. After allowance for correlation sampling error, it is impossible to distinguish on an ex ante basis between the risk-reduction capabilities of mean-variance portfolio selection models and naive diversification without regard to property type or geographical location. The naive portfolio diversification strategies of typical institutional real estate portfolio managers are rational responses to limitations on the informational content of statistical analyses of historical real estate data.